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ARGUMENT 
Appellant, G. Edward Leary as the Commissioner of Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions ("Commissioner"), responds to Appellee's Brief as follows: 
I. The Plain Language of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-20(7) Which Establishes Limits 
on Commercial Lending Apply to the Funds of the Credit Union. 
Mountain America Financial Services ("MAFS") has suggested that the 
Commissioner has improperly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-20(7) (Supp. 2001) by 
reading the word "CUSO" into the statute, and thus the Commissioner's decision to not 
approve two business loans made by MAFS was in violation of Utah law. See MAFS 
Brief at 7-11. This argument misses the point that § 7-9-20(7) applies to the funds of the 
credit union, rather than merely to the credit union itself. 
MAFS argues that because § 7-9-20(7) does not specifically mention the term 
"CUSO" that the limitations on business lending in § 7-9-20(7) cannot apply to a CUSO. 
See MAFS Brief at 9-10. However, this interpretation misconstrues the point of the 
Commissioner's argument. The Commissioner's focus is not on the CUSO itself, but 
instead on the funds of the parent credit union. Section 7-9-20(7) speaks to the way that 
credit union funds may be utilized with respect to lending. The Commissioner's position 
is that when a credit union creates and funds a CUSO, the funds in the CUSO are still 
properly considered credit union funds. Therefore, when a CUSO makes an extension of 
credit, it is the same as if the extension of credit was made by the parent credit union. To 
do otherwise would allow credit unions to avoid the legislatively imposed limitations to 
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their lending practices through a "strawman" transaction. These "strawman" transactions 
effectively allow credit unions to launder loans through the CUSO that the credit union is 
prohibited from making by statute. 
MAFS would like to limit the question before the Court to whether or not the word 
"CUSO" appears in the statute. To limit the issue in such a fashion ignores the fact that § 
7-9-20(7) is much more involved than MAFS would like. While it is true that § 7-9-20(7) 
does not contain the phrase "CUSO lending", § 7-9-20(7) does speak indirectly to CUSO 
lending by limiting the way that credit union funds may appropriately be used. Failing to 
require a CUSO or other subsidiary to use the credit union funds in accordance with § 7-
9-20(7) allows credit unions to evade legitimate legislative limitations. 
II. MAFS's Reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 7-l-301(8HSupp. 2002) For Standards 
For Proper Limitations on CUSO Lending Is Misplaced. 
MAFS suggests that the proper avenue for the Commissioner to impose lending 
limitations on CUSOs is under the authority granted to the Commissioner under §7-1-
301(8). See MAFS Brief at 12-14. The issue of whether or not the Commissioner has 
authority under § 7-1-301(8) to make rules with respect to CUSO lending was never 
raised before the trial court or at the administrative level, accordingly, the issue is not 
properly before the Court in this matter. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P. 2d 1356, 
1358-59 (Utah App. 1991). However, if the Court decides to consider the matter, the 
argument fails for several reasons. First, the issue is irrelevant to the matter before the 
Court. Second, § 7-1-301(8) does not allow the Commissioner to create a separate class 
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for CUSOs, therefore, § 7-1-301(8) does not provide authority for creating loan 
limitations for CUSOs by rule. Third, § 7-9-20(7) is a more specific statute that 
supersedes § 7-1-301(8) with respect to lending limitations. And fourth, if § 7-1-301(8) 
does provide rulemaking power to the Commissioner with respect to CUSO lending, 
nothing in § 7-1-301(8) would prevent the Commissioner from adopting the same 
standards as those contained in § 7-9-20(7). 
A. Other Possible Avenues for CUSO Regulation Do Not Excuse the 
Commissioner from Enforcing the Provisions of Utah Code Ann, § 7-9-
20(7)(Supp. 2002). 
MAFS attempts to argue that the possibility of the Commissioner having other 
means to address CUSO lending somehow precludes the Commissioner from enforcing 
the requirements of § 7-9-20(7). See MAFS Brief at 11. This argument misses the point 
that the Commissioner has the authority to require CUSOs making loans to comply with 
the requirements of § 7-9-20(7) because the CUSOs are making loans with the funds of 
the credit union. To argue that the Commissioner has other authority under which to act 
does not change the fact that the Commissioner has the authority and responsibility to 
enforce § 7-9-20(7) with respect to CUSO lending. 
B. Under Utah Code Ann. § 7-l-301(8)(Supp. 2002), the Commissioner is 
Not Granted Authority to Create Separate Rules for Credit Unions and 
CUSOs. 
Under § 7-l-301(8)(a), the Commissioner is granted discretionary authority to 
"create reasonable classes of depository and other financial institutions including separate 
classes for savings and loan associations and related institutions, banks and related 
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institutions, credit unions, and industrial loan corporations." It is curious that the rule 
does not speak to related institutions of credit unions. Given that the Legislature 
specifically authorized the Commissioner to create classes for related institutions of banks 
and savings and loans, it would appear that the Legislature did not intend to grant the 
Commissioner the authority to create separate classes for CUSOs as related institutions of 
credit unions. Therefore, if § 7-1-301(8) were to grant rulemaking authority to the 
Commissioner with respect to CUSOs, it would appear that CUSOs would have to be 
subject to the same rules as credit unions. 
C. Any Rulemaking Power Granted by Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-
30U8)(Supp. 2002) With Respect to CUSOs and Credit Unions Is 
Superseded bv Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-20(7)(Supp. 2002). 
The situation is further confused by the fact that § 7-1-301(8) is a general statute 
that is superseded by the more specific § 7-9-20(7). Under § 7-l-301(8)(b)(vi), the 
Commissioner could impose limitations on credit union lending as long as the limitations 
were based on an institution's capital. However, in light of the specific limitations 
regarding lending by credit unions contained in § 7-9-20(7), the Commissioner has been 
preempted from drafting rules with respect to credit union lending. As it is the 
Commissioner's position that the requirements of § 7-9-20(7) apply to credit union funds, 
even in the hands of the CUSO, the limitations of § 7-9-20(7) would also supersede any 
rulemaking authority that might possibly exist under § 7-1-301(8), with respect to 
CUSOs. 
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JL. Rulemaking Power Under Utah Code Ann. § 7-l-301(8KSupp. 2002) 
Would Allow the Commissioner to Impose the Same Limitations as 
Contained in Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-20(7)(Supp. 2002). 
I it iall> , € \ ei i if tl le Coi i n :t. lissioi lei 1 las i i llei i laking pow ei witl i respect to CI JSO 
lending under § 7-1 -301(8), there is nothing that would pi e\ ei it tl le Coi i in lissionei fi c i t i 
implementing the same standards with icspect to CUSOs as those contained in § 7-9-
"iil /) 1 he lending limits contained in , ! Jt>(' ) aic uu^..d on capital w it! I cei tain 
j i u x i i t i t f i t t l o a n l i n i i l a f i o i i v H I L T C is n u l l u m ' in ^ 7 I 'Ulh 'XI t h a i n o i i l t l \ i i t n ! e s t 111.if fin 
Commissioner could not impose maximum limits on CUSOs as well. 
TIT The Commissioner Properly Raised the Issue of Whether the Business Loan 
Limitations of Utah Code Ann. $ 7-9-20(7)(Supp. 2002) Apply to CUSO to 
Which the Argument Regarding Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-26(Supp. 2002) 
Relates. 
MAFS misstates the position of the Commissioner with respect to the application 
of I Jtah Code Ann. § 7-9-26. The Commissioner's position is not a new issue that a 
credit i n lie i I cai n lot ii r ' est ii I I lat i i lakes loai is. Instead, tl le Coi i n nissioi lei 's 
position is that a CUSO making loans in excess of the loan limitations in § 7-9-20(7) 
could pi it the credit union at risk of being in violation of § 7-9-26, as having made 
argued below in opposition to MAPS' Motion for Summary Judgement, specifically 
CUSOs must comply with the requirements of § 7-9-20(7). 
MAFS suggests that the plain language of § 7 9-26(3)(e) authorizes credit unions 
t ) in V Dst ii I loai is n ia.de b> tl le CI ISO See MAFS Bnci «* I *-
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is a misreading of the statute. Section 7-9-26(3) outlines the permissible investment 
activities of a credit union. Under § 7-9-26(3)(e), a credit union is authorized to invest its 
funds "in shares, stocks, loans, or other obligations of any organization, corporation, or 
association" if the organization, corporation or association meets the corporate purpose 
requirements of § 7-9-26(3)(e). [Empahisis added.] MAFS contends that the use of the 
term "loans" means that a credit union can invest in loans made by the CUSO. However, 
a careful reading of § 7-9-26(3)(e) shows that a credit union is authorized to invest in a 
CUSO or other similar entity by purchasing shares of the entity, purchasing stock in the 
entity, making loans to the entity, or acquiring other obligations of the entity. 
The use of the term "other obligations" shows that the terms "shares", "stocks", 
and "loans" are meant to refer to obligations of the entity, in this case the CUSO. A loan 
made by a CUSO to a consumer would not be an "obligation" of the entity. Only a loan 
made to the entity (CUSO) by the credit union would be considered an "obligation" of the 
CUSO. Therefore, § 7-9-26(3)(e) authorizes a credit union to loan funds to a CUSO or 
similar entity, but does not allow the credit union to invest in loans madr by a CUSO to a 
third party. 
IV. Examining the Actions of a Parent Does Not Constitute a Piercing of the 
Corporate Veil. 
MAFS alleges that in order for the Commissioner to apply the member-business 
lending limitations of § 7-9-20(7) to MAFS, the Commissioner must "pierce the 
corporate veil" and "imput[e] the actions of MAFS to its sole shareholder, Mountain 
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America." MAFS Brief at i 6. However, this argument misinterprets the purpose of the 
"corporate veil" theory. The "corporate veil" is designed to protect a stockholder from 
economic liabilitj • foi tl 1 i actioi is of tl le ei i1:ill:; ii 1 w 1 ii ::! 1 tl le stocl :holdei I las in\ ested ' 1 1 i i 
Utah Court of Appeals recognized this principle when it stated that the "purpose of such 
separation is to insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the corporation, thus 
limiting tl icii liability to oi lly tl le amount tl lat tl le stockholder s voluntarily put at risk." 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructor s. Inc., /m Kzd 4z, *+u i Utah ; '^> 
The "corporate veil" theory does not serve to prevent a regulator from ensuring 
that an entity within its regulatory jurisdiction is coti lply ing with the statutory and 
regulator, ICI|IHH'MVPI *y U» w 'n, h (In IT1 '! ' v ^ nh\c « H" I" w nm •, • r <VI ' M 1 I I iinii'ii 'und; 
to ensure compliance with relevant statutory and regulatory provisions does not expose 
the credit union to economic liability for the actions of the CUSO. Accordingly,, the 
coi poi atc 7cil tl leoi y does i lot act to pi e\ eiit the ti acii ig c f :;i edit I it ii• : t I fii n ids '"'* How ii ig a 
subsidiary to claim that the "corporate veil" prevents the Commissioner from examining 
how a regulated entity utilizes regulated funds would allow the regulated entity to evade 
legitin late regulation by placii ig ii inds in a subsidiai ) ' 1 1 le "corporate \ eil ' theory was 
not designed to allow entities to evade legitimate regulation by the formatioii of 
subsidiaries. 
CONCLUSION 
Based oi i tl ic foregoing ai id Appellai if 5 ii iitia.1 br ief G Edw ard I eai y , 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, respectfully requests that 
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this Court overturn the District Court's Order granting MAFS's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which vacated the Commissioner's Order subjecting CUSOs to the Utah Credit 
Union Act, and uphold the Order of the Commissioner. 
DATED thisZ-'S^day of November, 2002. 
PERRI ANN BABALIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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